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William Shawcross attempts to explain the American-European relationship after 9/11 and leading up to the Iraq war. He claims in his introduction that "the book isn't a narrative of the war in Iraq but a glance at one of the ways in which the international community, following 9/11, confronted evil." The book is indeed not a narrative of the war itself, but rather a narrative about how the war started.

The first chapter is essentially an overview of Iraq since the early 80's up until before the war. This chapter is poor at best. Many of the important details from this time period aren't even mentioned. There's no discussion of the U.S. coup attempt in the mid-90s, no discussion of how the U.S. was manipulating the weapons inspections process. The real reasons surrounding Desert Fox in 1998 are not discussed either. Shawcross lazily attributes it to Hussein's defiance, which is only half of the story. What happened in Iraq during the 90s was not merely the result of Hussein's actions. What the U.S. did mattered. It had an enormous effect, but Shawcross doesn't even begin to address it. He also appears to believe that the U.S. had no responsibility for the detrimental effects of the sanctions during the 90s. He attributes anyone's belief that the U.S. might bear some responsibility in this area to "Iraqi propaganda."

The next chapter attempts to compare and contrast Bush and Blair as leaders and why they would come together on the Iraq issue even though their partnership seems counterintuitive. In this chapter Shawcross continues his poor handling of Iraq events from the 90s as he attributes the Khobar towers bombing in Saudi Arabia to Bin Laden even though Iran and Hezbollah are known to be responsible for the attacks.

The rest of the book deals with the nature of the U.S.-European alliance and how it was strained as the U.S. prepared for war. He goes into great detial when explaining France and Germany's opposition to the war. Based on the rationale that Shawcross gives, it becomes easier to understand why there was so much opposition to the war. These chapters seem to give a fair treatment to the subject and Shawcross makes some, but not enough, progress in redeeming his poor coverage of Iraq.

Shawcross was a supporter of the war and believed that removing Saddam was the right thing to do. However, his understanding of the events inside Iraq are not correct or complete. It is possible to fully understand what happened in and to Iraq during the past 20 years and also support the idea of removing Hussein, but Shawcross is building his thoughts on a shaky foundation. He makes a strong moral argument in his conclusion, but when compared to his interpretaion of the sanctions and whether or not the U.S. was even partly to blame for their negative effects, really hurts his ability to make moral judgements. His coverage of the controversy leading up to the war seems complete when compared to other authors, but based on his first chapter, everything else becomes suspect.

First of all, the cover of this book as well as its title are both misleading. This book isn't just about relations between Tony Blair and George Bush per se. It is broader than that, encompassing relations amongst the big 4 allies, actually: Germany, France, Britain & the USA---pretty much ignoring Italy, Turkey, and other NATO allies. A more accurate title of this book would have been entitled something like: "The Collapse of Consensus: Euro-American Relations & the War in Iraq." There's nothing new in this book, however, but it does provide a rather concise summary of how heretofore Allied consensus ran aground over the shoals of whether to employ force against Saddam Hussein or not. Most involved were of the opinion, after all, that Saddam was a brutal dictator and that he was bucking the authority of the United Nations. Some just refused to countenance the use of force to do anything about it. A little history: UN Resolution #678 was adopted in 1990 authorizing all member states "to use all necessary means" to enforce the removal of Saddam's army from Kuwait "and to restore international peace and security in the area." Once such was accomplished, Saddam formally accepted ceasefire terms---codified under UN Resolution #687 in 1991---that he unconditionally give up all his chemical & biological weapons capability/stocks/development. Quoting Mr. Shawcross: "In March 2003, not one of the fifteen members [of the UN Security Council] doubted that Iraq was still in breach of all the relevant, binding Council resolutions since 678." (Incidentially, the word "binding" herein refers to the fact that Security Council resolutions are enforceable, unlike General Assembly resolutions---against Israel, for instance---which are purely political & NOT binding. So the double standard some see herein is but a canard.) Back to the above, it is not just the author's opinion that everyone was in agreement. You have only to consult the unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 (November 9, 2002) which threatened "serious consequences" for Iraq if it did not utilize this one last chance. France & Germany both voted for this resolution & 4 months later both continued to caution against calling "time's up" for Iraq to fully comply. French Foreign Minister Dominique De Villepin argued that "Everyone is faced with the choice of disarming Saddam Hussein peacefully or by force." To which, said Jack Straw, his British counterpart: "Dominique, that's a false choice. The choice, Dominique, is not ours as to how this disarmament takes place. The choice is Saddam Hussein's." A little more time, and a little more time, and a little more time, of course, accounted for the fact that Saddam had strung out the UN over this for over a decade up to this point. Listen to this view: "If we fail to respond today, Saddam, and all those who would follow in his footsteps, will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impunity, even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council, and clear evidence of a weapons of mass destruction program." So said Bill Clinton in 1998. Unfortunately it took September 11th to bring this issue to a head---and not because Saddam hard a hand therein, but because such made it then too dangerous a gamble anymore to let Saddam's unrenounced desire to use and/or develope---or transfer---chemical, biological, and/or nuclear weapons. September 11, you could consequently say, allowed the neoconservative view of pre-emption to gain traction; being expressed by the likes of Tony Blair, Jack Straw, & George Bush, as well by leaders in Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark, Australia, Bulgaria, Portugal, Holland, et al. Others, of course, preferrred the status quo, believing that September 10th thinking was still supportable in a post 9/11 world. Thanks for reading my review. Cheers!