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by Gordon A. Craig,Alexander L. George,Paul Gordon Lauren

  • ISBN: 019516248X
  • Category: Other
  • Author: Gordon A. Craig,Alexander L. George,Paul Gordon Lauren
  • Subcategory: Social Sciences
  • Other formats: lrf doc mbr mobi
  • Language: English
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press; 4 edition (August 31, 2006)
  • Pages: 304 pages
  • FB2 size: 1752 kb
  • EPUB size: 1398 kb
  • Rating: 4.3
  • Votes: 341
Download Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time fb2

Paul Gordon Lauren (Author), Gordon A. Craig (Author), Alexander L. .Statecraft has existed for thousands of years. It was the Greek empire that added the formal office of ambassador.

Paul Gordon Lauren (Author), Gordon A. George (Author) & 0 more. ISBN-13: 978-0195395464.

Gordon A. Craig, Alexander L. George. Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time. 0195092449 (ISBN13: 9780195092448). During his time at Stanford, Craig was considered to be a popular and innovative teacher who improved both undergraduate and graduate teaching, while remaining well liked by the students.

By Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. This is a combined historical and contemporary look at international relations by two distinguished scholars. They deal first with the changing nature of the international system, from the Peace of Westphalia to the present day, then those factors-negotiation, deterrence, crisis management, détente-on which the maintenance of balanced power and world peace have depended.

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Gordon Alexander Craig (November 13, 1913 – October 30, 2005) was a Scottish-American historian of German history and of diplomatic history. Craig was born in Glasgow. In 1925 he emigrated with his family to Toronto, Ontario, Canada, and then to Jersey City, New Jersey. Initially interested in studying the law, he switched to history after hearing the historian Walter "Buzzer" Hall lecture at Princeton University

Gordon A. George, Paul Gordon Lauren. Published by Oxford University Press, United Kingdom (2006). ISBN 10: 0195162498 ISBN 13: 9780195162493.

Another carrot includes political benefits. This can take many forms, such as restoring diplomatic relations and offering entry into an international organization. The European Union, for example, has membership requirements, referred to as the Copenhagen criteria, which are useful coercive tools toward potential members.

Alexander L. George was Graham H. Stuart Professor of Political Science Emeritus at Stanford University and the author or coauthor of many books, most recently "Presidential Personality and Performance" (1998). Kirjaluettelon tiedot. Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time.

Автор: Lauren, Paul Gordon; Craig, Gordon . George, Ale Название: Force and Statecraft ISBN: 0195162498 .

Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time, Fifth Edition, is a concise historical discussion and insightful analysis of diplomacy. It uniquely combines history, political science, and international law in order to explore how lessons from the rich experience of the past can be brought to bear on the diplomatic challenges that we confront in our world today. This new edition combines the cumulative insights and reflections of three internationally renowned scholars-who have written more than fifty books between them-with an astute, stimulating, and up-to-date treatment of recent global developments. These include American foreign policy, the rise of China, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction in North Korea, and nuclear enrichment in Iran. Significant attention is given to the powerful impact of technology on the "digital revolution," the revolution in military affairs (RMA), drones, eDiplomacy, the "information revolution," cyber security and WikiLeaks, command and control, surveillance and reconnaissance, and social networking sites. This edition also provides a sophisticated and thought-provoking analysis of "hard" and "soft" power, the "invisibility of security," human rights, ethics, law, legitimacy, and the threat and use of force as an instrument of statecraft.
Reviews about Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (6):
Force and Statecraft is a standard and outstanding text in its field. This review is intended for the diplomacy hobbyist inspecting the range of authors. For the student who read this book already as a university text, the rigors of thesis research and the 500 other pages in one homework night's reading may have caused you to miss some of the book's gems. As someone who falls into both of the above categories, I found this second reading (from the fourth and fifth editions) a pleasure.

"Force and Statecraft" does more than explain the evolution of diplomacy and the strategic use of force. The careful analysis defines diplomacy's application in international relations terms. It is one thing to study the theories of realism, liberalism, constructivism, security dilemma, idealism, liberal internationalism and the rest. It is another to witness these foundational concepts apart from their philosophical backers and intertwined in the thought and practice of preventing wars through global diplomacy.

According to the book editors, the story of diplomacy is one of constant adaption. "...the world never stands completely still. Over time, new forces, personalities, ideas, discoveries, and technological developments sooner or later challenge existing arrangements and bring about transformations." Adaptation requires creativity and resolve. Mentioned numerous times by the authors, it also requires a deep understanding of history; considering the context in each specific diplomatic challenge.

The newest edition expands the concept that the world never stand still. The necessary evolution of statecraft is driven by the same events and advances that should drive a review of the ethical application of force and human rights. The Just War Tradition might benefit from a consensus on "jus post bellum"; just war not only in the cause for intervention and actions in conflict but accountability after war. The responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine is only one more challenge to the expanding field of human rights in a truly global diplomatic imperative.

Statecraft has existed for thousands of years. It was the Greek empire that added the formal office of ambassador. To the ambassador position the Romans added laws that addressed government function and some diplomatic approaches; to which was added the more developed concept of self-interests from the Italian city state. Self-interest, however, was a loose cannon that placed no boundaries on the necessary or unnecessary expansion of a given state. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 began to formalize the system of states to include shared values that would influence diplomatic engagements.

It wasn't until the conclusion of Napoleon's wars that this system of states recognized the mutual need and shared interest for a more collective means of security. To self-interest and state sovereignty was added the balance of power. The Concert of Europe lasted roughly 100 years until the outbreak of World War I. In this arrangement, the European powers balanced each state's potential expansion in a system of formal diplomacy and alliances. In the mean time, to the governing laws of state was added the Geneva convention which focused on humanitarian law between and within states.

Statecraft has evolved in great part through the experience of war. War has the same defining effect on nationalism. Leaders who grow in experience through war often learn principles of statecraft that their successor knows only by study. It is the opinion of the book's authors that Kennedy and Khrushchev developed a mutual understanding through the Cuban Missile Crisis that their successors could not appreciate nor add to their statecraft advantage (pg. 99). In similar fashion, organizations are born out of adversity (League of Nations, United Nations) that future states and leaders understand only through history, not through the demands, passions and logic of that past reality. Structures do not lose their efficacy first; they first lose their vision and understanding of the common interest.

With the advent of journalism and news outlets, public opinion began to shape diplomatic efforts. Diplomats were beholden to public passions; bureaucratic accountability influenced by the law and opinion. Europe's diplomatic core had developed a familiar club of like-culture through the medium of the French language. Communication between nations was "simple" in terms of cultural interaction. Communication took much longer before the arrival of the telegraph, railroad, steamships and airplanes.

To the usual negotiated agreements of post-war reconstruction was added the concept of unconditional surrender at the end of WWI. The League of Nations, signed on by all the world powers (if only briefly) except the United States, added the supranational eyes of an international body. It is not as if East Asia, Central America or the Sahel of West Africa had not developed parallel diplomatic strategies for their own context but it was then that the mono-cultural European diplomatic core would face its biggest evolutionary challenge.

International relations was no longer the domain of five European powers. It was a multi-cultural, multi-lingual practice. Each addition to the evolution of global diplomacy itself continued to increase in complexity. Force and statecraft was forced to adapt to the evolving challenges of public opinion, technological advances and military equipment. Each of the aforementioned additions brought on larger bureaucracies to the diplomatic missions.

On the one hand, transparency deters corruption and can appease a grieving nation (South Africa's truth and reconciliation commission). On the other hand, open talks to mediate a conflict can stir an impassioned population into a frenzy of retribution instead of reconciliation. Confidential negotiations have their proper time and place; just ask Martin Kobler (mediator post-2011 Libya) or Lakhdar Brahimi (middle east mediator at large).

To the post WWII increase of states was added the United Nations which sought out areas of common interest and discouraged isolationism. The end of colonialism added even more members to the United Nations which was perhaps the biggest cultural shift the world of diplomacy had ever experienced (pg. 80). To the post-colonial era was added the television, Non-government Organizations (NGOs) and lobbyists. The public accountability was more than simply accountability, it became a calculation of passions and voter influence. Statecraft had to take into account nuclear war and the added sophistication of intelligence demands and capabilities.

The classical system of Europe permitted wars "as long as they did not threaten the system as a whole or the vital interests of other major powers (pg. 43)." This book's fifth edition greatly expands the conversation on human rights, the "indivisibility of security" in the language of liberal internationlism. Not only must the focus of collective diplomacy include world powers and developing nations alike but resorting to unilateralism becomes a form of isolationism; an overt criticism of post 9/11 U.S. foreign policy. The book's vision of liberal internationalism requires near 100% buy-in from the world's 200 states. Perhaps Buena de Mesquita could model a game theory for this impossible stag hunt.

Terrorism and non-state actors are just two of the most recent challenges to the evolution of force and statecraft. The fifth edition updates current events with more terrorist related examples. It also calls nuclear negotiations with Iran necessary if still "acute - and dangerous" (the fifth edition did not witness the 2015 deal). The book's brief history of the evolution of diplomacy is fascinating. It is to be expected that in the authors' take on history, when there is a lack of a diplomatic core of shared values, war will follow. Similarly, the authors expressed a clear disdain for isolationism.

The chapters of application take history seriously. The authors also comment on the weak use of history, the lazy selection of a historical event to justify a contemporary position. While the authors have a penchant for history, their statecraft could use a much more in depth look at culture and language. A nation's ethos, religious passions, language nuances, social rivalries, ethical persuasions, gender, age and demographic dynamics are all invaluable bits of knowledge that influence the table of negotiation, deterrence, coercion and conflict management. Culture and constructivism may not have a "theory of everything" but it is a force that influences everything.

The self-interests of a nation, to include the different nations within a state, are tied to more than security, wealth and power. On the one hand, "Force and Statecraft" provides a powerful defense for knowing and even having self-interests. Diplomacy would be lost without knowing what your ally, partner, friend, competitor and enemy wanted for themselves. Knowing their interests is the only way to seek out a resolution that has any staying power. Knowing one's own state interests is the only way to know whether an agreement is mutually beneficial or whether an enemy finds credible your threats of war and offers of peace.

Taking the discussion of ethics a little further "Force and Statecraft" includes a few thoughtful words on faith and state values. Faith-based values are intended to transcend man-made political systems. State values "ascribe moral worth to a particular state" (pg. 265). In a rare moment for a mainstream publication the authors explore ideas by Christian realists such as Niebuhr and Carr. The comments call for an update of Just War values, most of which stem from Judeo-Christian thought; expanding it to address the world's new structures. It is a sad irony that many Christian thinkers retreat to theories of state exceptionalism instead of leading the charge for a wider application of ethical statecraft.

One added evolution to the historical series should be that of global diplomatic education. It has never been the sole responsibility of ambassadors and foreign service workers to engage in statecraft and negotiation. Increased reliance on global partners in all sectors, global networks, social media and ease of travel mean that dozens of government institutions require diplomatic skills. The USAID worker, special forces operator, intelligence liaison, agricultural exchange officer, FBI coordinator and countless other agencies find themselves in the middle of culturally complex engagements that require the appropriate level of education and character. The latest QDDR (2015) calls this the "whole-of-America" diplomatic approach.

The embassy, and the ambassador, centralizers the process of host country engagement, ideally guiding the interaction of each agency towards the common interests. Let's face it, diplomacy has not been the sole responsibility of a few elite, commonly connected families for over a century. From the ground level source connected to cultural realities all the way to the white house situation room, traditional diplomacy is the process of gathering, analyzing and then only at the top, acting on the data. Good diplomacy includes negotiators at every level of the chain and the ability to connect respectfully and creatively with the counter-part.

With the decrease in global dictatorships, liberal democracy means that decisions that prevent and even manage crises come from ground level engagements, middle managers and professional organizations from almost every agency.

This is not just a book for hobbyists, theorists, generals, admirals and diplomats, it is an important education for practitioners of many colors.
This is a wonderful book for anyone interested in the use of military force and diplomacy. The book contains numerous case studies and provides lessons learned where military force succeeded and failed as well as where diplomacy succeeded and failed. It would be a useful book in the classroom as a text but equally useful to anyone just interested in when to discard diplomacy for a military option. I really enjoyed reading it.
I think it is good.
Okay, maybe not an entire IR degree. Most require classes in economics and geography as well. However, this was a required text for one of my international affairs classes, and it was one of the few books that I refused to sell back at the end of the semester, despite being the quintessential starving college student. Although it is clearly written and easy to understand, it is not simply a collection of truisms that any first year student would take for granted.
Force and Statecraft really does contain just about everything you need to know for an IR degree. It is organized by topic, which many of my classmates found boring. However, I found that this allowed for the clearest exposition of the ideas possible, and allowed the authors to examine each idea in detail before moving on to the next.
The pairing of the authors is excellent. Alexander George is a political scientist specializing in foreign relations, and Gordon Craig is a historian specializing in diplomatic and interstate history. I am convinced that it is this pairing that allows Force and Statecraft to have such a broad scope without losing any of its expertise, as often happens in books by a single author. Both are excellent writers, and their other books are highly recommended as well.
This book begins, as many IR degree programs do, with a diplomatic history course. This is essential to understanding international relations today, and Craig makes it exciting and interesting. It should be noted that this first section also covers the importance of economics and domestic opinion in the making of foreign policy, something that is often overlooked by other books. The book then goes on, topic by topic, to discuss the major topics in foreign policy, paying particular attention to the techniques of diplomacy and foreign policy, something also lacking in most books in the field. This is a book anyone interested in foreign policy should have on their bookshelf.

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