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by William Rose

  • ISBN: 0313257876
  • Category: History
  • Author: William Rose
  • Subcategory: Military
  • Other formats: txt lrf lit lrf
  • Language: English
  • Publisher: Praeger (December 5, 1988)
  • Pages: 209 pages
  • FB2 size: 1775 kb
  • EPUB size: 1319 kb
  • Rating: 4.7
  • Votes: 519
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Paul C. Warnke, Former Director, . Unilateral Arms Control Initiatives : When Do They Work? by William Rose. Paul C. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The first systematic appraisal of the utility of unilateral initiatives in arms control, this study combines theory and case studies to provide important insights and implications for .

William Rose is Professor Emeritus with the Department of Government . Unilateral Arms Control Initiatives: When Do They Work? Book.

William Rose is Professor Emeritus with the Department of Government and International Relations at Connecticut College.

American Interests, American Purpose: Moral Reasoning and . The Nuclear Seduction: Why the Arms Race Doesn't Matter-and What Does. New York: Praeger, 1989. By William A. Schwartz and Charles Derber. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

The author concludes that the American unilateral arms control initiative has helped to induce Soviet reciprocation and sometimes may be the best or. .Home Rose, William .

The author concludes that the American unilateral arms control initiative has helped to induce Soviet reciprocation and sometimes may be the best or only way to limit a particular arms competition, but it has failed at othertimes and using it can have costs. Unilateral Arms Control Initiatives: When Do They Work. Published by Greenwood Press, New York, 1988. Condition: very good. From Ground Zero Books, Ltd. (Silver Spring, MD, .

Arms control theory is now at a dead en. he stalemate in negotiations reflects an impasse in thought, former . Of course, unilateral or parallel measures have obvious limitations: countries are free to end self-imposed restrictions at will. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared in 1984. Russia and the United States also have experience in politically binding agreements: deals between the countries’ leaderships that do not have to be passed by the national parliaments.

Russia is also ready to consider the possibility of creating a multilateral arms control format if China voices support to this initiative. We drew attention to the negative consequences of the US’ withdrawal from the INF Treaty

Russia is also ready to consider the possibility of creating a multilateral arms control format if China voices support to this initiative. We drew attention to the negative consequences of the US’ withdrawal from the INF Treaty. We stressed that in the current situation when the treaty has ceased to exist we don’t want to leave the sphere of strategic stability unattended," Lavrov told a news conference. According to the Russian top diplomat, Moscow’s proposal to Washington to adopt a statement on the inadmissibility of nuclear warfare is still on the table.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were two rounds of bilateral conferences and corresponding international treaties involving the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cold War superpowers, on the issue of arms control

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were two rounds of bilateral conferences and corresponding international treaties involving the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cold War superpowers, on the issue of arms control. The two rounds of talks and agreements were SALT I and SALT II. Negotiations commenced in Helsinki, Finland, in November 1969. SALT I led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim agreement between the two countries

And the work of the original group of NPT negotiators includes Bill Foster, William Foster, who was the Director of.relations are at an historic low and the future of some key nuclear arms control agreements is in doubt, the .

And the work of the original group of NPT negotiators includes Bill Foster, William Foster, who was the Director of the Arms Control Disarmament Agency and later the first chair of the Arms Control Association when it was established, as well as people like Larry Weiler who will be joining us later here today. and Russia are not currently engaged in direct talks on strategic stability or further reductions or even the on-going dispute about the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

As a former negotiator, I wish I had had the benefit of Profssor Rose's insights and I am confident that future U.S. negotiators will profit from them.

Paul C. Warnke, Former Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

The first systematic appraisal of the utility of unilateral initiatives in arms control, this study combines theory and case studies to provide important insights and implications for U.S. policy.

Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford University

I consider Dr. Rose's book to be a very significant contribution to the field. The topic--unilateral arms control initiatives--is one that has drawn sporadic attention in the past, but I know of no better analysis of this important topic than Dr. Rose's.

Dan Caldwell, Pepperdine University

The question has been continuously debated since the 1950s: Should unilateral arms control initiatives be treated as essential steps toward world peace or as the product of wishful thinking that is in fact dangerous to our national security? Rose explores the problem through an analysis of Soviet responses to past American initiatives, where the U.S. exercised restraint in weapons testing, production, or deployment in attempts to obtain reciprocal Soviet restraint. In comparative case studies of six U.S. arms initiatives--some of which succeeded and some of which failed--he tests and evaluates a series of hypotheses about the conditions that may favor the success of such initiatives.

After outlining the major features of the arms control controversy, Rose surveys the theoretical literature to identify factors that may favor successful initiatives. These include aspects of the bargaining process; cost-benefit calculations about the military, political, and economic consequences of reciprocating an initiative; and other elements in the domestic and international environment that may effect the outcome of bargaining. The factors that are influenced by the domestic nature or international situation of the Soviet Union are examined in detail.



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